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Lack of insight, very frequent in schizophrenia, can be considered a deficit in Theory of Mind (ToM) performances, and is also
found in other psychiatric disorders. In this study, we used the first- to third-person shift to examine subjects with psychotic
and psychotic mood disorders. 92 patients were evaluated with SANS and SAPS scales and asked to talk about their delusions.
They were asked to state whether they thought what they said was believable for them and for the interviewer. Two weeks later,
79 patients listened to a tape where their delusion was reenacted by two actors and were asked the same two questions. Some
patients gained insight when using third-person perspective. These patients had lower SAPS scores, a lower score on SAPS item
on delusions, and significant improvement in their SAPS delusion score at the second interview. Better insight was not related to a
specific diagnostic group.
1. Introduction
Patients suﬀering from schizophrenia are incapable of recog-
nizing and monitoring the self or nonself induced character
of their own thoughts. This monitoring capacity, which
separates self-generated and world-generated perception, is
very important to distinguish between imagination and
normal perceptions. If this monitoring capacity is disturbed,
self-induced perception is experienced as world-induced [1].
There is increased evidence that patients with
schizophrenia have diﬃculties in social cognition which
requires sophisticated judgements about other people’s
mental states. People with schizophrenia have worse
performance profiles in tasks that require the interpretation
of social inferences underlying indirect speech.
Frith and collaborators, first applied the Theory of Mind
deficit hypothesis to schizophrenic patients, and since then
many studies have attempted to define the concept in a way
that could be tested experimentally [2–4].
It has been suggested that some paranoid symptoms
and behavioural signs could be a consequence of diﬃculties
in making inferences about the intentions and beliefs of
others [5]. Many clinical schizophrenic symptoms can be
reinterpreted as a disturbance of the “self-monitoring capac-
ity.” Impaired monitoring ability in schizophrenic patients
can lead to serious problems in understanding subtle,
context-dependent changes in the content and significance
of communication [6].
Lack of insight is a common symptom in schizophrenia
and can be considered a critical manifestation of impaired
ToM abilities. Insight in schizophrenia is operationally
defined according to five dimensions which include the
patient’s awareness of mental disorder, awareness of the
social consequences of disorder, awareness of the need
of treatment, awareness of symptoms, and attribution of
symptoms to disorder [7, 8]. Following these criteria, the lack
of insight can be considered an aspect of an impaired self-
monitoring capacity.
Lack of insight is not only found in schizophrenia,
but can also be found in other psychotic disorders and in
psychotic mood disorders [9–12]. Neurocognitive deficits
have been described both in schizophrenia and mood
disorders, and have been proposed to reflect underlying
neurobiological dysfunction [13].
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The lack of awareness of illness is not specific for
psychiatric patients and can be found also in neurological
patients. An example is emi-neglect syndrome, in which
anosognosia for hemiplegia and lack of awareness of illness
are fundamental symptoms. In their studies [14, 15], Tegner
and Marcel asked anosognosic hemiplegic patients about
their performances with their paralyzed limbs. The patients
described their limbs as normal.
However, if the authors asked the same patients, “If my
arm was paralyzed, could I shuﬄe a pack of cards?” some
of the patients responded “Of course not.” These results
indicate that in some cases, the passage from a first-person to
a third-person perspective can change the patient’s awareness
about his/her illness. We have previously hypothesized [16]
that this phenomenon could be a particular aspect of a
Theory of Mind task and have shown that 30 schizophrenic
delusional inpatients modified their opinion about their
delusions shifting from the first to the third person.
In the current study, we have evaluated 92 patients with
psychotic and psychotic mood disorders using first- to third-
person shift. This task resembles the ToM second-order
stories. Our hypothesis was that patients should gain insight
and self-monitoring capacity when listening to their own
delusions presented in a neutral context.
2. Subjects
92 (35 women, 57 men) patients participated in the study.
Patients were recruited from the inpatient service of the
Psychiatric Branch of the Department of Medicine, Surgery,
and Dentistry of the University of Milan Medical School.
All patients in the study had been admitted because of
their acute psychotic state. Only those who volunteered and
gave informed consent were included in the study. Informed
consent with respect to the purposes and the procedure of
the study was obtained from all subjects prior to starting the
testing procedure.
Diagnoses were made according to the DSM-IV-TR cri-
teria by the authors (S. Scarone and O. Gambini). 69 subjects
had a diagnosis of schizophrenia (21 undiﬀerentiated, 48
paranoid), 7 had a diagnosis of psychotic mood disorder
(6 of Bipolar Disorder, 1 of Delusional Depression), and 16
subjects had a diagnosis of other psychotic disorders (9 of
Psychosis not otherwise specified, 2 of Schizoaﬀective disor-
der, and 5 of Delusional Disorders). Inclusion criteria were
one of the previously cited diagnoses and the presence of
delusions. Exclusion criteria were organic illnesses involving
the central nervous system, current substance abuse and/or
past and current alcohol dependence, and clinical evidence
of mental retardation. Subjects were asked to participate
during the first part of their inpatient stay. All patients
were on antipsychotic medication at the time of our study.
25% of them were receiving 1st generation antipsychotics
(10% were taking oral medication and 90% were receiving
long acting therapy) and 75% were receiving 2nd generation
antipsychotics (19% of these were receiving clozapine). As
for patients with mood disorders with psychotic features
a mood-stabilizing medication was administered on top of
the antipsychotic medication to all 6 bipolar patients—all of
these patients were evaluated during a manic episode (two
patients received lithium monotherapy, two received lithium
and sodium valproate, one received sodium valproate
monotherapy, and one received lithium and lamotrigine).
One patient suﬀering from major depressive disorder with
psychotic features was receiving antidepressant medication,
specifically mirtazapine.
The patients had diﬀerent delusional contents; 80% of
the patients had delusions with grandiose, persecutory, and
reference contents. Remaining subjects had guilt, religious,
or bizarre delusions.
3. Methods
First part of the study: 92 subjects were assessed by means
of Scale for Assessing Positive Symptoms (SAPS, [17]) and
the Scale for Assessing Negative Symptoms (SANS, [18]) and
during the same session, the clinical interview for the Theory
of Mind test was performed. Subjects and interviewers were
well acquainted, thus facilitating open, relaxed conversation.
They were reminded that the content of the interview would
be used for the study. The patients were asked to tell the
interviewer the story of their illness. Each interview began
with the question: “I would like to know some more about
your story. Please feel free to tell me as much as you
remember about your current and past problems, how they
began and progressed.” The questions used to assess the
delusions were those suggested by Othmer and Othmer,
for example, “What is going on?”, “Why is it going on?”,
“What kind of thoughts did you have when you were last
hospitalised?”, “Where do your thoughts lead?”, “What are
you going to do about them?” [19]. The subjects were
encouraged to be as detailed as possible when describing
their delusions. At the end of the interview, each patient
was asked the same question, that is, if he/she considered
the content of his/her delusions believable. The questions
were “Do you really think that what you just told me is
believable? Do you have any doubts about it?” Then the
interviewer asked each patient the question, “If you were
the interviewer would you consider what you just told me
believable? If someone else told you what you just told me,
would you believe him/her?” Answers were scored according
to the following.
Question 1. The patient’s opinion about his/her ideas, that is,
if he/she considered his/her own delusional ideas believable.
Question 2. The patient’s idea about the interviewer’s point
of view, that is, if the interviewer could consider the patient’s
delusions believable.
Each interview lasted about 1 hour.
Second part of the study: the interviews were tape
recorded and transcribed during the first part of the study.
Subsequently, (with a delay of 2-3 weeks) 79 out of the
92 subjects, participated in the second part of the study.
At this time, 29 of these 79 patients had been discharged.
Each patient listened to his/her interview reenacted by actors
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(the content was identical but the voices were diﬀerent). At
the end of the tape session, the interviewer asked the same
questions. The questions were:
(1) “Do you think that the interviewed subject presents
believable contents?” and
(2) “If you were the interviewer would you consider what
the other person told him/her believable?”
Answers were scored according to the following.
Question 3. The patient’s opinion about his/her ideas, that
is, he/she considered his/her delusional ideas believable even
when presented by another person.
Question 4. The patient’s idea about the interviewer’s point
of view, that is, if the interviewer could consider the patient’s
delusions believable.
4. Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis used Chi-square and ANOVA. ANOVA
was performed on age, age at onset, duration of illness, years
in school, sex, diagnosis (schizophrenia, psychotic mood
disorder, or other psychotic disorder), SANS and SAPS score,
item “delusions” score, and improvement of item delusion
between first and second clinical interview for the two groups
of patients, that is, those who considered believable (do not
achieve insight) and not believable (achieve insight) both
for the first interview (Questions 1 and 2) and the second
interview (Questions 3 and 4).
5. Results
After the first interview, 91 out of 92 patients stated that
what they said during the interview (their delusion) was
believable for them. However, 12 patients thought it was
not believable from another person’s point of view. After
the second interview, 21 of the 79 patients who underwent
the second part of our study, stated that the content of the
tape was not believable. 17 of these 21 thought it was not
believable from the interviewer’s point of view whereas 4
of them thought it was not believable both for them and
for the interviewer. None of the demographic and clinical
variables was correlated with the answers the patients gave
at the first interview. However, the answers that the patients
provided after the second interview (Table 1) showed a strong
correlation with two of the variables, namely, item delusion
score at second interview (P < .027), and improvement
of item delusion score between first and second clinical
interview (P < .001). Patients with lower item delusion
score and a higher improvement of their item delusion score
from first to second interview were more likely to provide
a negative answer to our questions at the second interview
(Question 3, Question 4, or both questions). Obviously,
patients could express the same opinion about their delusion
at first and second clinical interview, or provide diﬀerent
answers. Most patients (77%) expressed the same opinion
whereas 23% expressed a diﬀerent opinion at the second
Table 1: ANOVA for delusion score and improvement of delusion
scores at second interview.
df F P-value
Delusion score 2 Between groups 2 3.79 <.027
Improvement of delusion Between groups 2 11.84 <.000
Table 2: ANOVA for change of opinion from 1st to 2nd interview.
df F P-value
SAPS score 2 Between groups 5 2.363 <.048
Delusion score 2 Between groups 5 3.110 <.013
Improvement of delusion Between groups 5 6.563 <.001
clinical interview. Analyzing the characteristics of the second
group of patients (Table 2), we found that the three of
the variables were strongly correlated with the change of
opinion, namely, total SAPS score at second interview (P <
.048), item delusion score at second interview (P < .013),
and improvement of item delusions score between first and
second clinical interview (P < .001). Specifically, patients
who gained insight (see Table 3) had a lower total SAPS
score and item delusion score at second interview, and had
a significant improvement of their item delusion score. Vice
versa, patients who lost insight had a higher SAPS and item
delusions score at second interview, and their item delusion
score was higher at second interview than at first interview.
Based on responses in the first and the second interview, the
patients could be divided into six classes and classified into
level of insight (Table 3). 53 patients showed a lack of insight
and 7 patients showed partial insight. 14 patients showed
either partial or complete gain of insight while 5 patients
showed loss of insight.
6. Discussion
As for the first part of the study, 91 patients out of 92 state
what they said is believable for them. 12 patients out of these
91, however, considered what they said was not believable for
the interviewer. This indicates that, similarly to Tegner and
Marcels’s study, shifting from first- to third-person perspec-
tive allows some patients to gain insight (albeit partial). This
may indicate that these patients have a functioning ToM and
are therefore able to gain insight when asked to modify their
cognitive perspective. Asmentioned, none of the variables we
considered was statistically correlated with the answers the
patients gave after the first part of the study. In the second
part of the study data are available for 79 patients. After the
second interview, 21 patients state what they heard from the
tape is not believable; 17 of these patients think it is not
believable from the interviewer’s point of view, 4 think it is
unbelievable both for them and for the interviewer.
Statistical analysis showed a correlation between a nega-
tive answer at Questions 3 or 4 (or both) and item delusions
score at second interview and improvement at item delusions
at second interview. This means patients that were less
delusional at second interview gave a negative answer to
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Table 3: Patients were divided into classes according to the answers they gave to the questions that they were asked after the first and the
second interview. Based on the responses the patients could be classified as either having lack of insight, loss of insight, partial gain of insight,
or complete gain of insight.
Class 1st interview Insight 2nd interview Insight Number
1
Believable for me
Lack of insight
Believable for me
Lack of insight 53
Believable interviewer Believable interviewer
2
Believable for me
Partial insight
Believable for me
Partial insight 7
Unbelievable interviewer Unbelievable interviewer
3
Believable for me
Lack of insight
Believable for me
Gain partial insight 10
Believable interviewer Unbelievable interviewer
4
Believable for me
Lack of insight
Unbelievable for me
Gain complete insight 3
Believable interviewer Unbelievable interviewer
5
Unbelievable for me
Complete insight
Unbelievable for me
Complete insight 1
Unbelievable interviewer Unbelievable interviewer
6
Believable for me
Partial insight
Believable for me
Lose insight 5
Unbelievable interviewer Believable interviewer
Questions 3 and 4 or both. These patients also show a
significant improvement at item delusion score between the
first and the second clinical interview.
The observation that patients who are less delusional
have better insight is consistent with literature data and
may depend on the fact that psychotic patients have a
rigid cognitive style and a certain overconfidence in their
opinions. Also, literature data indicate that the occurrence
of delusions is associated with low self-reflectiveness and
high self-certainty, possibly reflecting low cognitive insight
[20]. Studies comparing psychotic delusional patients with
psychotic nondelusional patients show that psychotic delu-
sional patients are overconfident in their opinions whereas
psychotic patients who are not delusional have a cognitive
style which is similar to healthy controls [21].
We also analyzed which patients expressed diﬀerent
opinions about their delusion at the first and at the second
clinical interview, and how their opinion changed. Most
patients (61), give the same answers at both interviews
(53 state the delusion is believable both for them and the
interviewer, 7 stating it is believable for them but not for
the interviewer, 1 stating it is unbelievable for both). These
patients show no significant variation at their item delusions
scores between the first and the second clinical interview.
18 patients expressed diﬀerent opinions about their
delusion at the first and the second interview. In particular,
10 switch from thinking that the delusion is believable both
for them and the interviewer to thinking it is unbelievable for
the interviewer (gain partial insight); 3 go from thinking the
delusion is believable for both to thinking it is unbelievable
for both (gain complete insight); 5 patients lose insight
stating the delusion is unbelievable for the interviewer after
the first interview and stating it is believable both for them
and the interviewer after second interview. Patients who
gained partial insight improved by a mean of 7.9 points
at their item delusion at the second interview. Patients
who gained complete insight improved by a mean 12.3
points; patients who lost insight worsened in their item
delusion score (on average 1.8 points) but had a mean
overall item delusion score at the second interview which
was significantly higher than the score of patients who gain
partial or complete insight (23.6 points versus 10.9 and 10.3,
resp.).
7. Conclusions
Our data indicate the improvement of delusions positively
correlates with the capacity to gain insight, and the greater
the improvement in delusion, the better the insight (a higher
improvement was displayed by patients who gained complete
insight). Overall, our data indicate that the shift from first
to third person allows certain patients to gain insight, by
using their ToM (making inferences about the interviewer’s
point of view). There is also evidence that the patients
ability to achieve insight into delusions is strongly related
to the intensity of the delusion itself. The less delusional the
patients are, the more likely it is that they will have insight
into their delusions, regardless of their diagnosis.
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